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Abstract 
 
This paper in concerned with the temporal nature of talk within conversation and its 
relationship with interpreting and understanding what is said. Within the field of 
conversation analysis (CA) Sacks (1992) urged analysts not to become concerned 
with how fast interlocutors are thinking as they talk with one another, but instead to 
focus on what is produced and in what way. This aversion to inferring mental 
processes has been taken up by analysts interested in examining discursive 
psychology (DP) through the ways in which discourse is produced in talk in terms of 
its orientation to psychological concerns (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992). Such an 
approach shares with CA an agnostic stance with respect to underlying mental 
processes as the modus operandi of conversational exchanges.  
 
However, this paper seeks to advance the argument that whilst DP had adopted CA as 
a methodology for its programme, it has strayed away from its focus on procedural 
possibilities, and instead has treated interlocutors as engaged in operations such as 
designing and interpreting what is said. In other words, it treats discourse as involving 
a tacit process which takes time to operate between interlocutors. This, in effect, 
leaves the conceptual door ajar for a mentalist construal of what people are engaged in 
doing when the talk to one another.  
 
The paper argues against this approach and instead suggests that much of our 
communicative conduct does not involve thinking before speaking, or interpreting 
what another person has said. The temporal nature of routine conversation is such that 
we act towards one another in terms of the words themselves. There is nothing in the 
use of words that requires the postulation or tacit acknowledgement that time is 
required to design and interpret what is said. Instead the argument is advanced that the 
flow of conversation and its intelligibility for participants, derives from the ability to 
use and react to language in a criterial fashion through the words themselves. It is the 
scenic aspect of most discursive practices that is key to understanding the speed of 
conversational exchanges, not the quickness of an assumed mental apparatus behind 
the words that are spoken.   
 
Introduction 
 
One of the most important questions in examining the temporal nature of conversation 
as it is experienced is the extent to which cognitive operations are involved in actively 
choosing what is said. For example, in a recent contribution to this question, Gibbs 
and Van Oden (2012) advance a view of pragmatics based on complexity theory 
which explains the pragmatic choices speakers make in conversations in terms of 
multi-dimensional factors. However, whilst this offers a more sophisticated view of 
the pragmatics of communication it is rooted in a view of human agents as engaged in 
operating as ‘micro-analysts’ of their environment and of each other’s conduct. In 
other words, it is based on a cognitivist assumption that people are engaged in 
communicating and talking with one another in terms of interpreting, decision-
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making, abstracting, aligning, and disambiguating and so on. The extension of these 
occasional practices to that of what people do in general in conversing with one 
another is a foundational assumption for those who would wish to examine how 
people ‘think’ whilst talking, and specifically how they can select the words they use 
in the temporal unfolding of conversation. In other words, talking and communicating 
become a matter of considering what might loosely be thought of as ‘the speed of 
thought’.    
 
However, whilst this approach may be a central issue for psychological approaches to 
the study of communication, a different and sociologically orientated approach can be 
found in the field of conversation analysis. The founder of this approach, Harvey 
Sacks, was concerned with the basic issue of how language can work as something 
that can be both culturally learnable and publicly understandable. Very early on (in 
the Spring of 1964) this led to his often quoted caution about researchers using 
cognitive intuitions:  
 
When people start to analyze social phenomena, if it looks like things occur 
with the sort of immediacy we find in some of these exchanges, then, if you 
have to make an elaborate analysis of it - that is to say, show that they did 
something as involved as some of the things I have proposed - then you figure 
that they couldn't have thought that fast. I want to suggest that you have to 
forget that completely. Don't worry about how fast they’re thinking. First of 
all, don't worry about whether they’re ‘thinking.’ Just try to come to terms 
with how it is that the thing comes off. Because you'll find that they can do 
these things (Sacks, 1992, vol. I: 11). 
 
This injunction against falling back on assumed mental operations as the generative 
mechanism for the production of talk-in-interaction led Sacks, and other conversation 
analysts who were inspired by his approach, to study in detail the mechanisms 
through which conversations works in terms of its ordered and scenic qualities. The 
focus on turn-taking and the normative patterns of various actions such as excuses, 
assessments, invitations, refusals etc., coupled with detailed transcriptions that include 
features such as  pauses, hesitations, vocal pitch etc. showed just how fast people do 
talk and how they do so within the joint nature of conversational activity.  
 
This conceptualisation of language as a social phenomenon was offered as a way of 
examining its properties empirically though a defined methodological approach that 
held up to scrutiny normative patterns of interaction. However, this has more recently 
been the subject of a more all-encompassing ontological social theory of action 
proposed by Theodore Schatzki (2001, 2002, 2006, 2010a, 2010b). As Schatzki 
argues “Human agency must . . . be understood as something contained in practices 
(i.e., as the performance of doings and sayings that constitute the actions that compose 
practices)” (Schatzki 2002: 240). By focusing on practices as the locus of sociality in 
this way, it is argued that everyday conduct is guided, not by intentional action, 
formal knowledge or conceptual understandings, but rather by routine practices, 
know-how, tacit knowledge or informal rules, which may be diffuse, indeterminate or 
unreflective (Turner 1994, 2007). Practices are therefore seen as primarily routine, 
habitual and normative events that happen, rather than purposive and generative 
processes.  
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Schatzki defines his social ontology as a “site ontology” that identifies practice 
‘timespaces’ as the “site of the social” (Schatzki 2002: 152, 2010: 6). Site refers to the 
“clearing” in which practices assume their spatial and temporal immanence and 
indeterminism. Thus whilst he shares with conversation analysis an eschewal of 
intentional states and cognitive attributes or ‘behind the back’ social structures as the 
engine of interaction, his focus on the  “indeterminacy of action” is at odds with the 
latter in terms of its concern with examining regularities in the way that actions are 
performed As he puts it  “I don’t see how the feature of human existence called the 
indeterminacy of action harbours any obvious or implicit implications about the 
proper or successful organization of human life” (Schatzki 2010b: 504). The 
theoretical contortions that Schatzki makes regarding the nature of agency are 
discussed at length in a recent paper by Caldwell (2012) but from he point of view of 
this paper what is interesting is that the nature of talk in conversation is considered as 
a matter of practice, quite literally in the sense of being learned through repeated 
interactions through which tacit understandings are developed. By extension of this 
argument the temporal dimension to conversation can also be considered as a matter 
of practice, although Schatzki leaves space for as he see it its largely indeterminate 
quality. Participation within a practice only takes on a determinate form as it happens. 
 
Is there a middle ground approach, one in which the metaphor of the temporal flow of 
conversation is guided by something which human agents orientate towards as they 
speak? Any contender for this approach could not rest upon the idea that 
conversational time is driven by internal cognitive operations involving interpreting 
and designing what was said, nor could it rely upon looking to guiding social 
structures having associated templates for action. Such an approach would therefore 
need to avoid theoreticism ‘down’ at the level of mental operation as well as ‘up’ at 
the level of over-arching social structures and processes. A candidate for such an 
approach is known as discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards and Potter, 1992) and it is 
to this that the next section of the paper turns.  
 
Discursive Psychology  
 
Although there is now a sizeable body of work in this area the aim of the paper is not 
to survey this literature but rather to examine its underlying assumption that agency is 
constructed within various social practices in terms of an orientation towards 
psychological representations. Agency is conventionally associated with how people 
think and feel and the way this relates to their actions. In discursive psychology these 
psychological representations provide the means for varied ways of engaging in social 
and institutional life and as a means of performing actions and making them 
accountable. Cognitive references to ‘thinking’, giving ‘reasons’, ‘knowing’ 
‘interpreting’ or ‘understanding’ are conceptualised as providing publicly accountable 
criteria for agency. Take for example, references to “thinking things through” or 
“thinking before acting”. These are presented as providing yardsticks for agency with 
respect to various activities such as making ‘decisions’ where the person is about to 
undertake some sort of commitment that involves certain consequences. They provide 
both the means for ordering people’s lives as the basis for agency and a way for others 
to consider, judge and assess these actions in the way that they are orientated towards 
in terms of duality of mind and world. 
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Cognition is regarded as the element of control and providing a basis for thinking 
before acting. The affective or emotional element is taken as being spontaneous and 
representing feelings but which can, nonetheless, be taken as an accountable basis for 
action. The emotional basis for action can be presented as understandable, as a means 
for literally moving a person to do something, or indeed for inaction. It is often 
portrayed as an influence on how people think, where thinking is taken as reasoning 
and emotion as providing a means of supporting this or as something that skews or 
bypasses it.  
 
This duality is presented in discursive psychology in terms of, for example, the ways 
in which emotion discourse can be a flexible and useful means of characterising 
action. Edwards (1997:170-201) notes emotion discourse can be put to a great variety 
of uses within a range of social practices due to their flexibility as an accounting 
resource. For example, they can be contrasted with cognitions in terms of their less 
deliberative nature; taken as being as understandable and appropriate as regards how 
any reasonable person would react; characterised as being the outcome of events or in 
the nature of the person; treated as being kept under the control of a person’s 
reasoning or as reactions that resist control; and presented as the interaction of mental 
and physiological systems, as natural, or as derived from moral and ethical concerns.  
 
Discursive psychology therefore seeks to respecify psychological phenomena as 
discursive constructions, orientated to by participants in the course of interactions as 
part of various social practices. In this project it has adapted the philosophical 
framework of Austin’s speech acts (1962) and Wittgenstein’s notion of language-
games (1953/1958). However, given that discursive psychology operates as a viable 
alternative to mainstream cognitive psychology it adopts an agnostic stance with 
respect to mental phenomena. It focus is  
 
In terms of its empirical basis, discursive psychology has borrowed heavily from the 
techniques used in conversation analysis. It therefore attempts to examine features of 
language use where interlocutors use various discursive devices in order to 
accomplish actions. However, unlike conversation analysis, it is less concerned with 
specifying these with respect to the intelligibility and organised temporal nature of 
interaction but rather focuses instead on how people orientate towards one another on 
the basis of psychological states and processes as the basis for action. Thus various 
psychological topics such as memory, attitudes, emotions, decisions etc. are 
respecified as discursive phenomena of interest. However, discursive psychology also 
examines conversation analytic type features such as the use of detail in narrative, 
membership categorisations, identity displays and so on. All of these features are 
therefore considered as performative with respect to the accomplishment of actions 
such as justifying, excusing, rationalising, praising etc.  
 
DP therefore involves a position in which it:  
 
“recognizes that there is some substance to the idea of referring to private 
mental states, though not as the analysts favoured theory of language and 
mind. […] The status of reference to internal mental states is not something to 
be refuted, even though it is conceptually refutable, but rather, studied as a 
practice within a public form of life.  People may sometimes talk as if, or on 
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the proposed and oriented-to basis their words are expressing inner thoughts 
and feelings.” (Edwards and Potter 2005, 256). 
 
 
Studying participants’ orientations, either in terms of direct psychological accounting 
or in terms of orientating towards aspects of an ‘inner/outer’ dualism is presented in 
as permitting another level of analysis in term of the study of the orderliness of social 
action through the rhetorical construction of discourse. It is argued that in this way a 
major cultural dualism is maintained: taking people’s ‘outward’ accounts and actions 
and considering these as representations of what they are like ‘inside’ as thinking and 
feeling agents. It is stressed in discursive psychological work that this derives from 
accountability within practices rather than as the result of some sort of inner mental 
cognitive processing and exchange of representations.  
 
It is suggested that this is part of a wider cultural commonplace, an inner/outer 
dualism, and which is integral to a range of social practices. The notion of these two 
separate realms is therefore taken as being a major rhetorical feature that is 
incorporated into how people interact with one another. It is also argued that this 
provides a means of trading on notions of sense making as well as the portrayal of 
people’s inner mental states. In other words, there is a cultural imperative to be seen 
to be intelligible and to be able to convey one’s thoughts and feelings in the form of 
judgements, reasons, and evaluations as the outcome of some kind of mental process. 
In perceptual-cognitive processing terms it is an input-process-output model.  
 
It is foundational to discursive psychology that this dualism is orientated to in 
discourse as part of the social practices that people engage in. It is something that 
people orientate to in terms of how they portray individual attitudes, beliefs, motives, 
goals, judgements etc. Notice here that orientating to something does not necessarily 
involve an explicit mention of these psychological terms but rather how people treat 
each other as if these are germane or at stake. In effect, this orientation is one of a 
discourse of an intra-psychic world as something that is normatively attended to as a 
means of accomplishing order within social practices.  
 
The nature of this order is founded upon an orientation to this discourse as related to 
mental processes in order to account for how matters are perceived and acted upon. In 
this way events are placed prior to this operation, as having happened and needing to 
be communicated, to be understood in terms of a response. People are situated 
amongst events and occurrences and a realm of mental operations that require to be 
brought together at a given time and place in terms of accountable action.  Accounts 
of actions are presented as part of texts of ‘meaning’ in which a mental processing 
system is assumed to be brought to bear upon matters in order to display them as the 
result of psychological agents who make ‘decisions’, have feelings, have deliberated 
on something or other or who account for something in a way that ‘makes sense’ to 
others. We can see why a person might act in a particular way given certain 
circumstances and the way they react to and deal with these.  
 
Those who take up a discursive psychology position argue that it is unhelpful to start 
from the assumption that such a dualism exists, that there is a psychological system 
that operates upon an external reality in order to produce rational thought. For one 
thing such an assumption is not necessarily a cultural universal, and for another 
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people themselves do not exclusively make reference to such a dualism in terms of 
‘sense making’ as they engage in various social practices. Discursive psychologists 
are therefore not saying that it does not exist but rather that for the purpose of 
studying how people make of use this dualism we need not start from a cognitivist 
position. Instead they argue that adopting a non-cognitivist approach allows for a 
focus on is how this inner/outer dualism is pressed into service as part of various 
social practices where rationality is something that is at stake or germane.  
 
Discursive psychologists also argue that it would also be absurd to begin from a point 
of doing what is the point of study, that is, how ‘reality’ and ‘mind’ are associated in 
order to do something or other. To take these as givens would be to fall back on 
‘experiential reality’ as a foundational assumption instead of examining what this 
dualism is used to do. It is argued that the analytic pay-off for this is in terms of 
achieving a means of dealing with its sheer pervasiveness as a means of 
accomplishing a range of social practices. Therefore an analytically agnostic stance is 
taken with regard to the ‘inner mind’ and ‘external reality’ and instead 
epistemologically relativist, or anti-foundationalist, position is adopted. In this way 
discursive psychology examines how versions of ‘reality’ are produced as part of 
what people do, and in particular as related to the production of what counts as an 
inner psychology as the basis of agency. It is claimed that the significance of such an 
analytical move allows the focus of study to become how the relationship between 
‘mind’ and ‘reality’ is not, for most people, some philosophical issue but a rather a 
practical sociological construction (Edwards and Potter 1992; Edwards 1997; Potter 
2003; Potter 1996; te Molder and Potter, 2005).  
 
The construction of an inner/outer dualism in people’s accounts presents a world of 
texts of meaning in which a mental processing system is assumed to be brought to 
bear upon this material in order to make sense of it, to provoke a reaction in terms of 
inner thoughts and feelings. In this way it is suggested that the inner/outer dualism is 
maintained as a pervasive discursive cultural common place: the construction of mind 
as an active perceptual-cognitive system working on what is beyond it. Such 
accounting is presented as a matter of public practice as people engage in various 
forms of social relations that are mediated through different social and organisational 
practices. The basis for a person’s agency has to be intelligible and therefore it is 
argued that such accounts must attend to this in their construction. In this sense the 
hearer of such an account is positioned as outside of the person’s thinking as another 
external psychological agent who must in the course of the account employ his or her 
own inner processes in order know the other’s mind.  
  
It is also argued that discourses of inner mental processes are constructed as relevant 
to a world of outer matters. One suggested technique in which the mind is made 
relevant is the notion of thinking leading to an outcome such as a decision or the 
forming of an opinion or judgment. This kind of direction presents the person as a 
psychological agent in terms of being able to form an independent judgment, as being 
able to decide matters for themselves. It is therefore argued that the inner/outer 
dualism is maintained through the construction of accounts based upon a rhetoric of 
access to the inner nature  of people’s psychology. This kind of discourse is rooted in 
the language of ‘interpretation’, of ‘thinking things through’ as a means of portraying 
a psychological individual through notions of points of view, motives and so on. 
People are also seen to construct accounts in terms of being affected by parrticular 
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circumstances that they experience and which becomes an explanation for their 
actions. This again preserves the inner/outer dichotomy: the outside world that 
influences the inner nature of the person. The hearer is again positioned as being 
given access to an inner world; as being let into a series of thought processes as a way 
building a rational account. This is considered as a normative orientation in how 
participants co-construct these accounts within different social practices. The upshot 
of this for the temporal nature of saptes of interaction is that talk is about ’playing out’ 
these orientations within sequences of actions.  
 
The Problem of Construction and Interpretation 
 
A problem arises for discursive psychology with respect to the construction and 
interpretation of what is said. In effect it trades on is the implicit imputation of 
mentalist notions to interlocutors. These are projected into the analysis of discourse as 
tacit understandings that are oriented towards. Thus whilst mentalism is not the 
favoured analyst’s theory, it is nonetheless presented as a lay theory attended to in 
discourse. This is then translated into the occasioned use of various psychological 
discourses. Commonplace idiomatic expressions such as ‘thought’ or ‘feeling’, ‘mind’ 
are therefore taken as being theoretically loaded and something to be analysed as 
such. As Sharrock (2009) points out there is nothing in the words used by speakers 
that requires the introduction of mentalistic conceptions that are related to 
performative display and interpretation. This raises the issue of how speakers engage 
in constructing world and mind in the course of their interactions. In other words, the 
issue of mastering language use is raised in terms of what is said and whether this is 
designed or not.  
 
The problem with discursive psychology is not that it fails to recognize language as a 
form of action, but rather that it burdens this with attempts to engage with this through 
the classical Cartesian lens of an inner/outer dualism. However, the position argued 
for here is that people should not be thought of as attending to what they, or others say 
through such a discursive psychological lens, but rather that they are first and 
foremost engaged in speech acts bound up with doing things through a host of 
linguistically constituted practices. It is not that people learn to use various linguistic  
‘devices’ within the temporal flow of conversation but rather that they engage in 
practices that are not separable from speaking. There is no need to conceptualise 
discourse through the lens of units of analysis; through a division of syntax, semantics 
and pragmatics. The codification of language use in this way privileges analytical 
convenience in terms of the imputation of psychological concerns over intelligibility. 
In Wittgenstein’s ‘private-language argument’ it is clear that the words and 
expressions we use are related to public or scenic criteria and not what they strand for 
in terms of some inner state. In this sense our use of language does not, for the most 
part, involve a mastery of a discursive psychology but rather is learnable by virtue of 
using as part of various speech acts. The idea that discourse involves attending to 
inner/outer orientations, that interlocutors attend to what it stands for in terms of some 
inner state is therefore a non-issue.  
 
Discursive psychology therefore imputes an inner/outer dualism as the basis for how 
people attend to one another’s language use. It is an interpretivist conception of 
language use that rests on a the view that people are engaged in constructing what 
they say as well as analysing what others say in terms of knowing how to proceed in 
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the temporal nature of the interaction. However, by following Wittgenstein’s line of 
argument, then it can be argued that language use and comprehension do not normally 
require design, thought or interpretation. Comprehension and understanding can be 
considered as interactional achievements of proceedings, whilst interpreting what is 
said is an activity that one engages in. In other words, there is a tendency in discursive 
psychology to treat people as if they were engaged in taking time (however short) to 
rhetorically construct their discourse through various ‘linguistic devices’ or in 
‘analysing’ what was said. However, it can be argued that this is not the case and that 
for the most part people are engaged in doings things in the world in terms of speech 
acts rather than treating words as standing for something or other. Intelligibility and 
the nature of language use are in this sense bound up with speech acts which, in most 
of their everyday interactions, simply involves getting on and doing it akin to gestural 
movements rather than engaging in inspecting the basis for what is said with reference 
to some inner state.  
 
Conclusion: Talk, Time and Turns 
 
The key to understanding the temporal dimension of talk and what interlocutors are 
engaged in is to avoid the trap of any such inter-subjective reification of the notion of 
language as involving communication between minds.  A key, proponent of this view 
is Coulter (2005) who brings to ethnomethodology a Wittgensteinian attention to the 
logical grammar of concepts, but convincingly argues and demonstrates that 
conceptual analysis is invaluable in appreciating language use in logico-grammatical 
terms. Coulter argues, following, Harris (1981) that language and the ability to 
converse with one another is best thought of in instinctual terms. Now whilst this may 
imply for some a linkage with behaviourism, it is far from being the case. Indeed it is 
possible, to think as George Herbert Mead did of language as “a differentiation of 
gesture, the conduct of no other form can compare with that of man in the abundance 
of gesture” (Mead, 1910a: 178). As he says in evolutionary terms we have to consider 
the communicative function of language as arising from prior gestural conduct (Mead, 
1934: 17). 
What does this mean for the temporal nature of conversation? The foregoing 
arguments suggest that we cannot conceptualize ordinary everyday language use in 
terms of designing and interpreting what is said. This would be to fall back on 
cognitivist assumptions and lead us down the path of considering the speed of thought 
rather than focusing on the situated practices of conversing with one another through 
turns at talk. It is easy to slide into such a cognitivist view of language but such a 
view detracts from considering language use in terms of actions. If we instead focus 
on actions and, like Mead, consider these as extensions of gestures, then a clue to the 
temporal nature of conversation may lie in the idea that such gestures are joint social 
activities. Mead still left open the door for an inter-subjective consideration of 
language as related to knowing each other’s minds, but it is also possible to take an 
approach to this issue in terms of the words themselves. Language, as Coulter (2010) 
argues is not a system to be conceptualized in terms of a tripartite division between 
grammar, syntax and pragmatics but rather is a very much related to logico-
grammatical usage in which the words themselves are self-sufficient. There is no need 
to consider the speed of thought as an index of language use, or to turn to socio-
structural determinants as ways of framing of the temporal dimension talk. This is not 
to say that people never think before they speak, never design what they are about to 
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say or do not operate within the time frames of structured organizational forms of 
interaction. However, these cases are not necessarily the routine pattern of everyday 
interaction where, for the most part, people are not engaged in ‘interpreting’, 
‘designing’, ‘planning’ and so on in the course of the flow of conversing with others.  
The latter kinds of activities do take place, but when they do they are the subject of 
procedural patterns that are brought into play in their very doing. Interpreting is not 
something that is read into an activity from ‘outside’ but rather is worked at from 
within where speakers engage in doing this activity and in a reflexive manner with 
each other.  
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